Your DORA Exit Plan Has a Gap: File Data

The plan exists. Has it been tested?

Every bank, insurer and investment firm in the EU now has an exit plan on paper for each ICT provider that supports a critical or important function. The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) has required it since January 2025, and supervisors check for it when the Register of Information arrives each spring.

The question supervisors are now asking is harder: would the plan actually work?

Reviewing DORA's first year in December 2025, Germany's BaFin reported that firms had an exit plan for fewer than half of the services from critical ICT providers that support their critical or important functions. Where firms rated the service impossible to replace, only 43% had one. BaFin also found that three quarters of the 19 critical ICT third-party providers designated at EU level are based outside the EU, most of them in the US.

For most financial institutions, one service fits both descriptions: the platform that holds their files.

What DORA actually asks of an exit plan

DORA does not ask firms to leave their providers. It asks them to prove they could, without disrupting the business, and to understand the risks of staying.

Three parts of the regulation matter most here:

  • Article 28 requires an exit strategy for every ICT service that supports a critical or important function. Firms must also assess concentration risk and the risk of relying on providers in third countries.
  • Article 30 requires contracts for those services to include termination rights, transition periods and exit support.
  • Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1773 goes further. It expects a documented exit plan for each relevant arrangement, reviewed and tested on a regular basis.

The word that matters is tested. A clause saying "we can terminate with 90 days' notice" is not an exit plan. An auditor wants to see how the data leaves, where it goes, how long the move takes, and evidence that it has been done.

The pressure is rising on the concentration side too. In November 2025 the European Supervisory Authorities designated 19 critical ICT third-party providers for direct oversight, including Amazon, Microsoft and Google. When so many critical functions run on so few providers, the exit plan for each one carries more weight.

Why file data is the hardest exit

File data is not one system. It is the shared drives that loan officers, claims handlers and analysts open every day. It is the archives that retention rules require firms to keep for ten years or more. Increasingly, it is also the datasets behind AI models that will soon need their own audit trail.

Over the past decade, many firms moved this data behind a cloud file gateway, which made storage simpler and cheaper to scale. It also made the exit harder, for three reasons.

  1. The format may belong to the vendor. Some gateways store files in the cloud in their own structure, not as ordinary files. Leaving can mean reading back and rewriting every file, often hundreds of terabytes, through the vendor's own software.
  2. The business cannot stop. A credible exit moves data while people keep working. A plan that assumes a weekend cutover for 400 TB of active shares is not a plan an auditor will believe.
  3. The jurisdiction travels with the vendor. Keeping data in an EU region answers where the disks are. It does not answer who can be ordered to open them. A provider headquartered in the US can be required under the US CLOUD Act to disclose data it controls, wherever that data is stored, and DORA asks firms to assess exactly that kind of third-country risk.

The result is the pattern BaFin described: an exit plan that exists because it must, for a service everyone quietly assumes will never be exited.

What a testable exit for file data looks like

The fix is not a better document. It is an architecture where leaving a storage provider is a routine operation, not a project. A file data exit plan an auditor can trust has four properties:

  • The front end stays put. Users keep the same file servers, drive letters, paths and permissions. Only the storage behind them changes.
  • The back end is replaceable. Data can move to a different storage provider, or back on premises, without changing applications or retraining staff.
  • The move is gradual. Data migrates in the background, share by share, with a point to roll back to at every step.
  • It has been done. On a set schedule, a representative share of data is copied to the alternative target, read back and checked. The result goes into the exit plan as evidence.

When those four hold, the exit plan becomes short and concrete: the target is named, the method is known, the duration is measured and the last test date is on record. That is the kind of entry that survives a supervisory review.

How Tiger Bridge helps

Tiger Bridge is a data management layer that runs on a firm's own Windows file servers. It moves files between local disk and whatever storage the firm chooses: EU object storage, private cloud, tape or a second site. Users see the same files in the same place, wherever the data physically sits.

That design turns the exit plan into an everyday operation.

  • Swap storage without touching users. Tiger Bridge works with any S3-compatible, cloud, tape or on-premises target. Changing provider is a configuration change and a background transfer, not a platform replacement.
  • Test the exit. Replicate a share to a second EU provider and check it.
  • Leave your existing gateway. Tiger offers a structured migration path off cloud file gateways, with the file servers in service throughout.
  • Add no third-country exposure. Tiger Technology is headquartered in Bulgaria and is EU-owned. Support and escalation sit in Sofia. The software is self-hosted.
  • Keep the keys. Encryption happens on the customer's side, with keys the customer manages. Tiger has no access to customer data or cloud credentials, so Tiger holds no customer data that it could be asked to hand over.

Tiger Bridge will still appear in your Register of Information, as every ICT provider does. The difference is what that entry says: an EU vendor, software you run yourself, keys you hold, and storage you can change.

Five questions to ask before the next register

The Register of Information that firms submit in 2027 will show their contracts as of 31 December 2026. Before then, put these five questions to whoever runs your file platform.

  1. If we had to leave this vendor within 12 months, how long would the data transfer take, and who would run it?
  2. Can we read our files without the vendor's software?
  3. Where is the vendor headquartered, and which foreign laws can compel it to disclose our data?
  4. Who holds the encryption keys?
  5. When did we last test the exit, and where is the evidence?

If any of these questions is hard to answer, the exit plan is not finished. The good news is that this is one of the few DORA gaps you can close with architecture rather than paperwork.

Next step

Score your current file platform in a few minutes with the free EU Data Sovereignty Risk Assessment. It rates jurisdiction, key custody, lock-in and exit readiness, and gives you a PDF report to share with your risk team.

Or talk to our team about testing a file data exit with Tiger Bridge.

Tiger Bridge helps financial entities meet DORA requirements for ICT third-party risk management and exit planning. It does not on its own make an organization compliant with DORA.